| In
brief, the Moral Supreme Court... |
| |
would
provide for the primary rights of all enfranchised citizens
within a moral democracy socially to access their government
individually as its logical plaintiffs if they'd socially
contracted
first from within that logic for which our humanly-common
source hierarchically provides
the a priori assumptions. It's also then that the supreme court
which would hear their complaints wouldn't require the logical defendant
which a trial within the
trial
court would because
the plaintiff wouldn't hold any individual human to judgment. As for the
appellate court, they'd hold the
language-analogous law to judgment
instead, but there's uniquely would be that of their nation-state's constitution
which they'd allege to vary from the authority within that
moral
source. |
| |
The
logical
plaintiff
would retain her or his private rights to do so even if she or he otherwise
employs within the public sector. That she or he also had
chosen to become political and a secondary custodian of everyone's equally-applied
rights otherwise standardizably wouldn't abrogate her or his primary individual
right socially also to enjoy the equal application of those rights. Logically
for them to apply, she or he also could bring others as counsel and witnesses
into the hearing while none within the interest group personally could
claim or invoke the moral authority of their public-sector purposes
otherwise. She or he alternatively also could have such another appear
in her or his stead as a stand-in logical plaintiff. Thusly,
only there and then could a true "moral majority" of all the people institute
from without morally to retain their collective authority to be the primary
custodians of their inclusive
social
contract even while
they'd delegate some among themselves secondarily to vest with custodially-purposeful
authority within the legislative,
executive and judicial
branches on an occasional or continuing basis. |
| |
It's
then that only the commonly-meaningful application of analogous
laws is in question where and when only the people equally as primary custodians
ultimately can initiate socially-common constitutional changes from outside
the judicial system by utilizing the executive offices of
the legal
service's elections division. Given that no individual
initially stands to judgment, the elected judges would replace trial
jurors judgmentally to render these applications within the hearing because
their own custodial duty would be to uphold the rule of moral law and not
judge particular individuals through its authority. Their logical
number standardizes to be three because then they'd represent the society
rather than a single individual where and when the plurality of a moral
majority democratically still would apply among themselves. That
is, any socially-instituted judgment morally requires a democratic
means if politically it would affect our primary individual rights. Moreover,
that number morally next accords better than larger ones because it more-greatly
reduces the greater society's demand upon its resources. |
| |
Other
standards would apply to admit those who could or must audit, transcribe
from and provide policing within the hearing itself as well as publicize
it without. They'd also determine the administrative law which would accord
for and to all its participants. That law standardizes as it does within
the trial
court with two major variations. First, the three
judges must vote one of themselves to be the lead spokesperson and personnel
manager for all because the moral rule of law itself doesn't fail if one
individual truly is a personnel manager only. It even supports a more-just
outcome because the outcomes politically achieved alternative to this democratic
one either immorally would be undemocratic or would permit a disorder within
which other's rights more likely wouldn't accord. The second permits everyone
equally to participate as only a trial's jurors would because any changes
in analogous law commonly affects them while the fate of an individual
defendant wouldn't. Therefore, all would have the primary right to question
and argue positions as the jurors otherwise would, even while a moral majority
of the judges assume the jurors' other duty to make the ultimate judgment. |
| |
A constitutional
statement to be judged also may have originated the "charge" partially
from the application of which jurors had judged individuals. Overturning
it morally then standardizes the "class-action" basis for actions by the
"guilty" who next could become logical plaintiffs themselves.
As handled through the trial court, they could request exoneration
and must be exonerated if the original plaintiffs or- if the latter are
deceased or unenfranchised- their stand-ins wouldn't prosecute. If they
would, each of the affected new plaintiffs next must name an individual
or, serially, individuals who by recourse to the original charge effected
his or her adverse judgment within the earlier trial. His or her
own charge specifically also would standardize within the statute
law
to be "civil" rather than "criminal," one either first framed by the legislature
or as inferred directly from the constitution to apply. Only there and
then could there be an equal application of the inclusive law through that
law where and when all socially would play by the same rules on a level
playing field. |
| |
If
overturned, the contested language next would move to legal
services
for possible removal from the constitution after a referendum vote
of the people. Directly or as personnel managers, the judges would see
to this through the coordination of the supreme court's clerical and media
personnel with their expertized counterparts within the executive
branch.
Regardless of the outcome, the same would apply with regard to those within
that other branch's division of ownership records. |
| |
Thus,
these custodial humans as individuals would coordinate under the
rule of that moral law which standardizes to converge upon that coordinate
end. It logically would where and when a true moral majority
of the people immorally even could change their constitution to have it
otherwise. That is, no classified corpus of the analogous law- not even
coordinately that of the constitutionally "highest-" is immune from the
authority of those who apply their law ignorantly within or dedicatedly
from our human source. In sum, even that source commonly
to which we could refer rationally only describes what has been,
is and could be. It doesn't
prescribe what should be or proscribe
what shouldn't. Only we individually can do that by implementing its truths
and facts hierarchically as they apply to our kind socially in common.
It's morally then that we even can be immoral by acting unethically from
within its descriptive applications- amorally so if we're political
and formatively ignorant and immorally so if we're political and
formatively aware of but not dedicated fully to implementing its logic |
| |
It's
now that you, too, can know this along with this writer who is but
a fallible individual and messenger for that which at least could make
you formatively aware. You also can know our kind to have been formatively
ignorant and politically amoral even while recognizing the humanly-common
formative fact which is our "essential ignorance" of the rational facts
we otherwise only could describe roughly in their sensibly and expatiatedly-differing
particulars between us. There and then, this applies to mean that they-
perhaps you?- fully aren't culpable for their crimes even of commission.
You'd also realize that our politically-instituted supreme court
justices and their counterparts amorally and unethically have ruled as
men from top down where and when, at best, they've interpreted our constitutions
variably and divisively as best they could- that we've been their subordinates
politically as well. |
| |
There
and then, you even could choose to become formatively dedicated—choose socially to act in moral defense—in moral
civil
disobedience
if needed. Such a defense and disobedience are moral of course because
they do form to respect the equally applied rights of all even otherwise
to submit to our unknowingly amoral tyrants. Regardless of where
and when each of us does "draw the line," we must reform the social
contracts which would have us swear our allegiances to our constitutions
and/or human dictators as well as the countries which always have standardized
the presence of both. At least we must if we'd form that first morally-exemplary
nation-state which could lead to our becoming the moral as well as- with
rational limitations- sovereign species.
|