| In
brief,
the Moral Trial... |
| |
would
be an official-to-citizen transaction within the trial court
within which officials would have custody of the equal rights of all individuals
as citizens of their own or another
social contract. The
logic enabled from within our one humanly-common formative
source would provide the custodial terms for judgment where and
when the word-analogues of language would reflect that thoughtful
process and source first within their constitution and/or next within the
statute law which their moral
legislative branch
provides. |
| |
That
logic applies to make all officials custodially responsible to the citizens
whose standardized "primary rights" they must respect. This applies for
them while they participate with "secondary rights" of their own, doing
so as multiple jurors, a moderating judge, one or more bailiffs, and a
court-employed media expert to transcribe the procedings at minimum.
An auditor and/or other media experts from the executive
branch and/or an auditing legislator from the legislative
branch
also may attend in the primary interest of all others better to know
how their custodians performed within what ultimately forms socially to
be their own standardized "event of custodial judgment." |
| |
Because
it is, bailiffs as the court's police also must admit them directly
to witness trials disinterestedly on a first-come, first-served or lottery
basis. Unlike them, others who may appear purposefully are custodial. These
include the "eye" and "alibi" and expert witnesses relevant to the standardized
"initiating event" as it would relate to the charge. Those who problematically
are "expert" include the investigative police and technicians from
the
executive branch as among those who'd interpret the physical
evidence from the scene as well as the likely mental states of the participants
therein. |
| |
A
logical
plaintiff must appear and a logical defendant
charged by that plaintiff may, only the former purposefully as a custodian.
Each equally also has the applied right to legal representation within
the trial because language requires expertise where and when its
use would apply to them as equal adversaries. Thus, at their election,
legal counselors may appear as provided either from legal services
within the executive branch without financial cost or the
private
sector.
Regardless, none custodially would represent the "state" because no moral
self-interest logically accords to make that amorphously-abstract
word-concept a litigant either way. |
| |
It's
then that the jurors actively would participate within custodial
judgment, the judge but a personnel manager who'd preside through the court's
administrative
law
within the process. They'd question all the participants, themselves included.
They'd also judge them all as their custodial roles logically would
bear on the initial charge and their own roles in adjudicating it. |
| |
They'd
independently judge all these and the initial charge itself morally through
applied standards. That is, their findings against the legal charge or
any custodial individual wouldn't necessarily exonerate any given individual,
as discussed at greater length on the trial-court page.
Yet the charges against any individual equally must apply as well. This
means there only could be one moral charge as relevant to one act having
a demonstrable consequent within the initiating or custodially-secondary
event. |
| |
Only
then truly could we honor the rule of moral law. For instance, this would
prohibit such "trumped up" charges as "resisting arrest without violence"
and redundant ones as "reckless driving" which we bundle with that of "driving
under the influence." Our rulers as men within police and legal
and judicial interest groups at least tacitly know
that these extra charges conveniently serve only their own individual interests
as instituted, that they are disposable only to make themselves and the
system upon which their own self-interests depend look good to defendants
and society at large. |
| |
Two
other applications also standardize. One is that while people violate rights,
their acts to impair their own abilities isn't a chargeable crime itself.
The other is that any custodial individual- a police officer included-
must act as a logical plaintiff in his or her own equal behalf
unless the unenfranchisable are at exigent risk or an enfranchised other
first represents himself or herself as that plaintiff. These converge upon
the charges mentioned above to mean that "driving under the influence"
of alcohol or other legal or "illegal" drugs, as under the less-likely
ones of being narcoleptic or short of sleep, isn't a valid charge while
"reckless driving" or "manslaughter" may be. |
| |
That
within many social contracts our rulers as men diminish even
our conceptually-"equal" rights by calling some "privileges," as for the
act of driving itself, further evidences their top-down control. The jury
and all other participants must proceed from a differing hierarchical ordering-
a formatively-moral one. Only then could we all truly exist on a level
playing field. |
| |
The
moral trial within a trial court must evidence this. As it
is, we only have the moral alternative civilly to disobey
those who'd not custodially act judgmentally in our interests. Socially,
our moral defense requires this or for us to accept what
otherwise we could change. Please join us in that disobedience if only
as yet through language or- as jurors- by hinging your final judgment
of the accused upon these moral standards as best you can. In many societies
at least, you won't suffer the penalty of law if you do. Yet if you serve
as a juror and don't, also please know that you, too, politically
will have acted to be criminal yourself. |