| In
brief,
the formative logic... |
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provides
standards through language which hierarchically devolve from that
formation which is our humanly-common source. As what
we can call "logic" within what more generally we call "philosophy,"
it does so if we first think in order to know how that hierarchy
applies to our individual and social-group behaviors. As then known, we
may or may not act or react from its moral or rational applications within
and with regard to our social contract
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It's
then that the formative logic morally applies to prescribe
and proscribe certain behaviors ethically to be enacted or not as
well as to describe their enactments as among all the rational facts
which sensibly we can and do witness. That is, it disinterestedly permits
us to move beyond the traditional logical systems which its source
also explains and enables from the outset. We've called those systems by
two names, and neither the "morality" claimed from a standardized "deduction"
nor the "objectivity" from the "induction" which only yields our rational
facts has met our human challenge. |
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Only
the formative logic can. It alone bridges the gap between these otherwise-irreconcilable
logical systems also to explain and enable their own formations. Only its
logical application places both within their subordinate formations
with the "morality" of the theologian and the rationally-factual descriptions
of the scientist, say, only having private authority where and when we
socially would contract with one another morally. |
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That's
because our common source provides the referents we otherwise miss
as the base assumptions ("premises") for drawing ("inferring") our conclusions.
Both only exist within the formative logic morally to prescribe and
proscribe our behavior clearly as political in contradistinction with the
fully-optionable private behavior we'd otherwise evidence. It's then that
our source's leading truths most-highly prioritize to converge with the
formative fact of our essential ignorance of sensibly-rational facts. That
is, those truths and that fact socially are our common ground even while
they converge upon the particulars which needlessly otherwise do divide
us.
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It
then follows socially for us to protect our language-analogous and
other sensibly-enacted particulars of individual behavior, that we politically
must protect each individual's fully-optioned, private rights even
if they logically standardize otherwise to be deductive or inductive as
motivated or interpreted. Therefore, the formative logic applies socially
to vest each human individual equally with primary rights as a particular
entity-event within a moral
social contract whether
or not a true moral majority implements or sustains that contract
within a moral democracy. |
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It
logically also follows that their politically-governing custodians would
rule only through the analogues of a ruling moral law if and while all
morally do contract. That is, they must act by secondary right of
their social participation to be the moral custodians of that analogous
contract if they'd first not abrogate it. This applies while and because
each individual sensibly first forms equally with greater authority than
what we infer to be that "society" to which we contractually next could
refer through the logic. Therefore, they'd morally not have the right unethically
to act even if the people they'd serve contractually first would abrogate
because individuals ultimately are responsible morally only for their own
acts before we'd apply such labels as "society." |
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All
this applies whether or not the people vest the custodian with politically-instituted
support. With it, the custodian would act unethically by misrepresenting
others custodially. Without it, she or he also could be political and morally
vulnerable with all enfranchised others- would be unethical if acting to
deprive unwilling or unenfranchised others of their own equal or precedent
rights. That forms logically to be morally excluding. Physically
denying another access to a public place with space otherwise available
provides one example where and when the right of sensible access excluded
first forms equally for both. If one kills the other to deny it, the right
formed precedently for the deceased because the right to live standardizes
to be more authoritative than the right sensibly to access any place
or not.
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Such
logically-obtained hierarchical standards follow from the primary truths
of "inclusion" and "space" which converge to produce the formatively-moral
fact of a "presumptive inclusion" which the excluders violate. A
"presumptive convergence" then similarly forms from the truth of "time"
within a first-unified "space-time" logically to imply moral standards
for other rights, including those which vest the unenfranchised
presumptively with their own social rights from and within the formative
logic. This includes that humanly-common and truthful "entity-event" which
sensibly forms in the particular from and within our natural environment
as well as our own species in its undeveloped or underdeveloped members.
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While
likely you logically can infer to conclude other applied standards yourself,
it perhaps still remains for me to point out that even the thoughtful,
formatively-aware logician not only shares the inductive logician's
grasp of the sensible rational facts but will find that one's own descriptive
and moral authority logically attenuates with the increased relevance those
particularized facts present. That is, like him and me, even you essentially
are ignorant of the rational particulars where and when that commonly is
a formative fact of greater logical authority itself.
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Formative
logic therefore morally includes inductive logic only if we politically
don't impose ourselves immorally/unethically as applied from the standardized
"moral facts" which form to be its leading tenets. Moreover, none of us
is omniscient or perfect even if formatively we do dedicate to be moral
while inferring from its commonly-leading assumptions as the premises which
next also include the rationally-sensible particulars. Yes, and this includes
our knowledge of one another as well.... |
The
Formation
Quest
& Society