| In brief,
the Moral Trial Court... |
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would be
a politically-purposeful interest group within the judicial branch
of the public sector. Its fully-employed custodians would
include an elected judge and unelected clerical,
media and policing
experts whose socially-instituted purpose is to effect moral trials
which minimally also require a logical plaintiff, an identified
individual
as an initial defendant, and a jury. The court also must provide for other
experts, witnesses, the auditing public and a physical defendant. Each
of these only must appear as willing and without coercion within
the trial's place and process because all humans morally have a primary
private right socially to participate or not which overrides until
politically she or he first does assume custodial purpose. |
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The
presiding judge first assumed that purpose as also to be a personnel manager
within and outside the courtroom. Outside it, she or he would see that
clerical expert(s) coordinate with all purposefully-affected others including
the media and ownership records divisions within the
executive
branch. She or he also would see that the court's
media expert(s) would transcribe all such official-to-official transactions
for perusal by auditors from within the purposeful public sector
and, ultimately, from among private citizens who equally could access the
unexpurgated information through the executive-branch
divisons. |
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During
trials,
the judge would maintain order and have all proceed through language
which logically defers to our humanly-common source.
This would be the "administrative law" which standardizes to permit
no human politically to rule from top down. For instance, it would prevent
the judge and others from "plea bargaining." It also would prohibit them
individually or as an interest group from imposing even a disinterestedly-arbitrary
standard of "statutes of limitation" because justice follows no time limit.
Yet, such standardized concepts do exist within our immoral social contracts
unjustly to serve the convenience of our legal experts, especially our
judges in league with our counselors within their own morally-relative
and elitist interest groups. |
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Administratively,
jurors freely could question all participants, including the judge on applied
points of administrative or statute law. The latter standard
of classified law also prioritizes if a moral legislature
enacts it and a logical plaintiff uses its authority as a
standardized "charge" against a defendant. Otherwise, the jurors may refer
to the more-general language of the constitution where and when that alone
would justify the trial and their judging all participants
within it as well. It's also then that anyone within the trial or
not could become a logical plaintiff to challenge the lawful charge
itself, appearing before the appellate court as but a later
alternative if still unsatisfied. |
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Jurors,
like elected judges, would qualify by enfranchisement, not expertise. Unlike
so-called "judges," they alone actually would judge- evenhandedly
judge all which logically is relevant to judging the original defendant.
This includes the lawful charge against
the original defendant within a standardized act of "jury nullification."
Yet the original defendant detachably still would stand to their judgment,
as would everyone else within the judgmental event to the extent their
acts adversely would affect their judgment of the original defendant. |
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For
instance, police officers must be within it if they'd offer evidence.
The jury also could judge and sentence them for the illegal search for,
seizure, and/or "planting" of a weapon as well as perjury or its subornation
for misrepresenting the same. This would be collateral to their judging
the defendant for whom they might or might not find evidentiary grounds
for exoneration. In sum, there are no moral grounds for "dismissing" any
"case on technicalities" if all first truly are equal under the rule of
moral law. Yes, and this, too, would be within the judge's administrative
law in her or his "charge to the jury" at the very outset of the proceedings. |
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Other
disinterested legal standards logically devolve from or more fully
to follow from within the formative hierarchy to bear on
the trial court. The formative fact of our essential ignorance
of rational facts even if we witness their sensibly referents directly
is a leading example here. This devolves to apply to require multiple jurors
and their unanimity in judgment. How many jurors is another question, and
here we at least must be arbitrary without violating the disinterested
authority of the hierarchy. I'd suggest twelve, the number of executive-branch
domestic divisions which also could apply to a jury which also would execute
custodially- albeit only in language-analogous judgment. |
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Essential
ignorance also sustains the "presumption of innocence" jurors must apply
in their custodial judgment. Its authority also sustains our moral imperative
to require a unanimous verdict for conviction. It also invalidates the
Hammurabic dictum of an "eye for an eye" also as extended as a death for
a death. These are absolute consequents for what we can't absolutely know
to sustain them. Moreover, we're essentially ignorant even if we do
apply moral standards to find a perpetrator "partially culpable"
either through standardized "negligence' or that he or she didn't know
the social consequents in advance even if "fully culpable" through willfulness.
This also applies even if the jury would exonerate him or her from two
other moral standards, that of the "accident" or the presumption of innocence
itself. |
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We
breach the hierarchical authority of many other applications
in the name of "justice." For instance, our conveniently-selective prohibitions
against "double jeopardy" stand out to the immoral contrary. Retrials must
occur given new evidence and a still-active logical plaintiff. No ex-post-facto
"miscarriages of justice" then could occur, and those who would initiate
retrials (or first trials) with "frivolous" grounds still would stand also
to equal judgment themselves. |
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Maintaining
the moral order with equal rights extant within the courthouse and trial
room finally requires two other moral applications. One would have the
court's
police, its bailiff(s), physically intercede appropriately
if and as needed. This would be within their expertise and custodial authority
as supported by the analogous law which bears on our moral defense.
The other applies to the trial only. It requires standards of proportionality
for sentencing which anticipate the convergent enforcement acts of those
within a moral penal system who also have an expertized purpose
as police from within the executive
branch. |
The
Formation
Quest
& Society