The Formation Quest & Society
The Moral Trial Court within the Judicial Branch
In brief, the Moral Trial Court...
  would be a politically-purposeful interest group within the judicial branch of the public sector. Its fully-employed custodians would include an elected judge and unelected clerical, media and policing experts whose socially-instituted purpose is to effect moral trials which minimally also require a logical plaintiff, an identified individual as an initial defendant, and a jury. The court also must provide for other experts, witnesses, the auditing public and a physical defendant. Each of these only must appear as willing and  without coercion within the trial's place and process because all humans morally have a primary private right socially to participate or not which overrides until politically she or he first does assume custodial purpose.
  The presiding judge first assumed that purpose as also to be a personnel manager within and outside the courtroom. Outside it, she or he would see that clerical expert(s) coordinate with all purposefully-affected others including the media and ownership records divisions within the executive branch. She or he also would see that the court's media expert(s) would transcribe all such official-to-official transactions for perusal by auditors from within the purposeful public sector and, ultimately, from among private citizens who equally could access the unexpurgated information through the executive-branch divisons. 
  During trials, the judge would maintain order and have all proceed through language which logically defers to our humanly-common source. This would be the "administrative law" which standardizes  to permit no human politically to rule from top down. For instance, it would prevent the judge and others from "plea bargaining." It also would prohibit them individually or as an interest group from imposing even a disinterestedly-arbitrary standard of "statutes of limitation" because justice follows no time limit. Yet, such standardized concepts do exist within our immoral social contracts unjustly to serve the convenience of our legal experts, especially our judges in league with our counselors within their own morally-relative and elitist interest groups.
  Administratively, jurors freely could question all participants, including the judge on applied points of administrative or statute law. The latter standard of classified law also prioritizes if a moral legislature enacts it and a logical plaintiff uses its authority as a standardized "charge" against a defendant. Otherwise, the jurors may refer to the more-general language of the constitution where and when that alone would justify the trial and their judging all participants within it as well. It's also then that anyone within the trial or not could become a logical plaintiff to challenge the lawful charge itself, appearing before the appellate court as but a later alternative if still unsatisfied. 
  Jurors, like elected judges, would qualify by enfranchisement, not expertise. Unlike so-called "judges," they alone actually would judge- evenhandedly judge all which logically is relevant to judging the original defendant. This includes the lawful charge against the original defendant within a standardized act of "jury nullification." Yet the original defendant detachably still would stand to their judgment, as would everyone else within the judgmental event to the extent their acts adversely would affect their judgment of the original defendant. 
  For instance, police officers must be within it if they'd offer evidence. The jury also could judge and sentence them for the illegal search for, seizure, and/or "planting" of a weapon as well as perjury or its subornation for misrepresenting the same. This would be collateral to their judging the defendant for whom they might or might not find evidentiary grounds for exoneration. In sum, there are no moral grounds for "dismissing" any "case on technicalities" if all first truly are equal under the rule of moral law. Yes, and this, too, would be within the judge's administrative law in her or his "charge to the jury" at the very outset of the proceedings.
  Other disinterested legal standards logically devolve from or more fully to follow from within the formative hierarchy to bear on the trial court. The formative fact of our essential ignorance of rational facts even if we witness their sensibly referents directly is a leading example here. This devolves to apply to require multiple jurors and their unanimity in judgment. How many jurors is another question, and here we at least must be arbitrary without violating the disinterested authority of the hierarchy. I'd suggest twelve, the number of executive-branch domestic divisions which also could apply to a jury which also would execute custodially- albeit only in language-analogous judgment. 
  Essential ignorance also sustains the "presumption of innocence" jurors must apply in their custodial judgment. Its authority also sustains our moral imperative to require a unanimous verdict for conviction. It also invalidates the Hammurabic dictum of an "eye for an eye" also as extended as a death for a death. These are absolute consequents for what we can't absolutely know to sustain them. Moreover, we're essentially ignorant even if we do  apply moral standards to find a perpetrator "partially culpable"  either through standardized "negligence' or that he or she didn't know the social consequents in advance even if "fully culpable" through willfulness. This also applies even if the jury would exonerate him or her from two other moral standards, that of the "accident" or the presumption of innocence itself.
  We breach the hierarchical authority of many other applications in the name of "justice." For instance, our conveniently-selective prohibitions against "double jeopardy" stand out to the immoral contrary. Retrials must occur given new evidence and a still-active logical plaintiff. No ex-post-facto "miscarriages of justice" then could occur, and those who would initiate retrials (or first trials) with "frivolous" grounds still would stand also to equal judgment themselves.
  Maintaining the moral order with equal rights extant within the courthouse and trial room finally requires two other moral applications. One would have the court's police, its bailiff(s), physically intercede appropriately if and as needed. This would be within their expertise and custodial authority as supported by the analogous law which bears on our moral defense. The other applies to the trial only. It requires standards of proportionality for sentencing which anticipate the convergent enforcement acts of those within a moral penal system who also have an expertized purpose as police from within the executive branch.

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Last modified on October 15, 1999