T
he
Formation
Quest
& Society
The Moral Legislative Branch
within the Moral Social Contract
T
he
Formation
Quest
& Society
| In brief, the Moral Legislative Branch... | |
| would be a politically-purposeful interest group within the public sector of government. Its elected and expertized members would coordinate among themselves and with their counterparts within the executive and judicial branches. All would have custody of a moral social contract which commonly originates from the human's condition. The authority of this formative source then would vest in the language of a constitution within and through which all enfranchised citizens first and last would govern morally from that formative basis or not. | |
| If they would, they individually could participate politically within a moral democracy or not, electing some of their instituted custodians within the legislative and other branches of the public sector. It's then that the formative logic socially would apply to standardize legislative-branch individuals collectively to form one moral interest group with custodial purposes first forming from the right of a true "moral majority"of all the people immorally even to change the word-enabled legal conditions of their social contract. | |
| If all the people remain dedicated to the human source which includes the formative truths and facts which hierarchically apply through its logic to explain and enable even our ability to act otherwise, the legislature would have little to do. Yet even there and then, the constitution would be of a language written and known by imperfect humans. Legislators as equally-enfranchised citizens also could initiate changes to it through referenda—for better or worse. They'd also do so through legal services within the executive branch. | |
| Our related problems with and within language as the analogue of the sensibly knowable apart, the logical application yet admits to the formative fact of our essential ignorance ultimately of all sensible particulars, and this alone sanctions our legislators custodially with moral purpose. That is, they must codify laws which more particularly apply constitutional precepts given that the people whose rightful needs they morally must meet couldn't easily apply them themselves and bear the primary right to know the social consequences of their acts before enacting them. | |
| The particular conditions for this standardize clearly to include four classifications of law, the administrative, regulatory, civil and criminal. The administrative includes their own "in-house" activities "in session." These are the "rules" by which they'd hear, discuss and pass statute laws, those civil and criminal laws which logical plaintiffs may cite and file to be standardized "charges" against a defendant within a trial which the trial court within the judicial branch would conduct. The civil law also may include the administrative laws pertaining to other political interest groups whose members first wouldn't supply them. | |
| Their own administrative law would abide moral standards. One follows from their need to open their sessions to the people who also directly could bespeak their own beliefs. Another also follows from the primary rights of the people as that converges with the moral rule of law rather than men. It applies to require legislators to "sit on" revolving committees where and when all legislators first must audit other public-sector interest groups before they'd return to report within a meeting of the "committee of the whole" in open session. So abiding, they'd better be able to codify law based particularly more on everyone's needs within the standardized "official-to-official" and "official-to-citizen" transactions they'd witness and participate in. | |
| The legislature would codify two types of regulatory law. One apportions resources among all moral interest groups. The constitution first would authorize this with the public and private sectors having equal shares which they'd next specify to include access to the electromagnetic spectrum for telecommunications, say. The other protects the citizen-consumer's primary rights by requiring themselves to specify the duties of political custodians to them. It's these which those within the business and professional regulation division within the executive branch better could enforce as also to reduce the number of logical plaintiffs at the political interface of both custodial sectors. | |
| Civil law then would include statutes which logical plaintiffs could use to prosecute their socially-instituted political custodians for a standardized "nonfeasance," "misfeasance" and "malfeasance" by reference to the analogous laws they'd otherwise apply differently. Therefore, only political custodians within the social sectors civilly could be judged and only then for denying another's primary right secondarily to participate politically within their social contract. This prosecution of the person next then would take place within the moral trial of the trial court as distinct from challenges of the laws themselves which would involve the appellate court within the judicial branch instead. | |
| Statutes of criminal law similarly would follow to prohibit any individual from acting physically to exclude another of her or his primary rights. These rights preeminently are to person or personal property and socially to participate politically. If another ordered an excluding individual so to act, she or he arguably also ruled as a man and not from moral law. Therefore, she or he also stands to charges under the criminal statutes. This standardizes to apply both domestically and internationally and to individuals with or without instituted political authority. | |
| In sum, legislators would act in and out of session to obtain input from logical plaintiffs, themselves equally included. We'd delegate them the politically-purposeful authority only to codify analogous beliefs as law given that the other interest groups within a moral social contract ethically also would transact on a level playing field. Therefore, they'd only enact such laws as individuals would require if those individuals first couldn't infer their applications from the constitution otherwise. Only there and then, would the individual's formatively-prior right clearly to know the rules of the political "game" in advance morally accord equally to all at all. | |
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