Human Knowledge
The Individual and Society
Human Knowledge
In brief, the formation of human knowledge... |
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| involves the interplay of one's physical neurology with one's analogous mind. Therefore it becomes the object of a standardizably complete psychology as well as of a similarly-formed philosophy. As to both, it forms through and from the formative truths which apply to standardize man operantly to be a conditioned as well as freely-wilful, self-aware and directed life form. For and among humans, it motivationally and behaviorally also converges with and often diverges from a parallel formative fact of "thought" where and when an also-analogous language standardizes to be the only medium of that thought- that thought which you the reader first must undergo to understand any of this. | |
| Knowledge then can be of that thought which words make possible- your words to converge upon or diverge from these words as first or next neurologically to imprint for later possible recall from within your standardized "subconscious." The psycho-physical referent for that word-embodied subconscious as its word-analogue then forms to be a formative fact because it is common to us all. | |
| You and I then can think to understand that the sensible referents which otherwise we call "words" are like other sensed referents to be a rudimentary form of imprinted knowledge. Yet only if we do think can we even first understand what makes them "words." That is, the referent for "thought" itself first makes them more than what we'd otherwise responsively only know to be "words" operantly through conditioned association alone. | |
| Other life forms share the primary human characteristic for this operantly-conditioned response. Therefore it's our unsensed, immaterial- analogous- ability to abstract characteristics from what we sensibly know which distinguishes us from them. It's then that we thoughtfully can assign words to represent the essence of other words present or absent their sensible stimuli. It's this analogous and un-sensible process which permits us thoughtfully to perceive a sensibly-available stimulus and conceive what's sensibly unavailable. It's also this which permits us to abstract and verbalize the essence of and for those formative truths which hierarchically explain and enable all of it. | |
| It's then that the formatively-factual human subject analogously permits this. Yet even therein where and when and if we first do think as next to know we also share a formatively-factual "essential ignorance" of the rationally-sensible facts. We can't absolutely know with ultimate authority that, for instance, other life forms don't share this primary human characteristic with us. Yet, given what sensibly we can know, they likely don't. That other primates only can or we ourselves alternatively can associate words only as words with other such sensibly-imprinted words and/or other such merely-sensible referents doesn't in itself support that they do. | |
| Within the formative logic, we can account for such behavior otherwise. We can think to know that a subconsciously-motivated operant conditioning easily does explain it. Etiologically within that logic, we can also think to know that a sentiently-imprinted source of knowledge then is the necessary but not sufficient cause for that and our own individual behavior, socially or otherwise. | |
| Yet we also can motivate through thought. Through words we can perceive that which we sense. We even can contemplate to understand through words within thought before socially we do act. Yes, and the last is a precondition to our rationally being most human and not simply the operantly-conditioned lackeys for others of our kind who'd rule us as men. | |
| Moreover, we commonly form with a rational sovereignty which limits because we essentially are ignorant through our senses, and this is so even for those who aren't ignorant formatively. This applies to mean that even the formatively dedicated who do know and motivate to be moral can make mistakes, and the likelihood that they would increases proportionally with the influence of rational facts upon their standardized applications from the leading truths. | |
| More dauntingly, we're not even that far yet. We even still must overcome the rational fact that we virtually all condition to the hierarchical rule of men rather than of moral law, that we condition to self-interested and serving word-concepts rather than word-formatives. In sum, this is what we know, and only your thoughtful contemplation can precondition that morally-errant knowledge otherwise. | |
| Socially, we've yet to form our kind's first moral nation-state, but that knowledge also starts with you and me. Each of us and others after us first have to think even before we commonly could know and next respond to what commonly does form to explain and enable how all of us have erred in our past. In the meantime, we'll also need to know the standards of and for a moral civil disobedience. | |
